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PROBLEMS IN IMPOSING EXTENDEDTERM SENTENCES UNDER SECTION
5-5-3.2(b)(2) OF THE UNIFIED CODE
OF CORRECTIONS
BY IAIN

D. JOHNSTON*

INTRODUCTION

Section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) of the Illinois Unified Code of Corrections
("The Code") allows a trial court to impose an extended-term sentence for any felony accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.1L Generally, the
maximum sentence which may be imposed by a trial court is enumerated in section 5-8_1.2 However, when certain aggravating factors are present, the trial court may impose an extended-term
sentence. Although section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) allows for extended-terms
for all felonies, section 5-8-1(a)(1) 3 and section 9-1(b)(7) 4 both contain the identical phrase, "exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
indicative of wanton cruelty." However, section 5-8-1(a)(1) provides
for natural life imprisonment for a murder accompanied by such
behavior 5 while Section 9-1(b)(7) provides for the death penalty for
such behavior if the defendant was convicted of first degree murder, was 18 or older at the time of the offense and murdered an
* J.D., The John Marshall Law School, cum laude; B.S., Rockford College, cum laude. Although the views expressed herein are mine, I would like to
thank Professor Ralph Ruebner and Mr. Eugene Doherty for their help.
1. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3.2(b)(2) (1989). The statute permits
but does not require the imposition of an extended-term sentence. See People v.
Frey, 467 N.E.2d 302, 305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (applying section 5-5-3.2(b)(1)).
The imposition of an extended-term is discretionary. See infra text accompanying note 103. See also People v. Lighthall, 530 N.E.2d 81, 86 (InI. App. Ct. 1988).
Further, because the determination to impose an extended-term is a discretionary matter for the trial court, it need not be alleged in the charging instrument.
See People v. Turner, 416 N.E.2d 1149, 1154 (IMI. App. Ct. 1981).
2. 1. REV. STAT. ch. 38, par 1005-8-1 (1991).
3. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(a)(1) (1991).
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b)(7) (1991).
5. Section 5-8-1(a)(1) provides the following.
Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense, a sentence
of imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the
court under this Section, according to the following limitations ...for first
degree murder,... if the court finds that the murder was accompanied by
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty...
the court may sentence the defendant to a term of natural life
imprisonment.
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individual under the age of twelve.6 This article will focus on section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) except in those areas when a comparison of the
statutes helps explain an issue.
Part I discusses the general application of section 5-5-3.2(b)(2)
in sentencing defendants convicted of felonies.7 Part II enumerates
factors that Illinois courts have considered in imposing extendedterm sentences under section 5-5-3.2(b)(2). 8 The enumeration lists
those factors which are appropriate and those that are questionable.
The enumeration will also contrast cases which, although factually
similar, reach different conclusions as to whether section 5-53.2(b)(2) is applicable. Because of the problems in applying section
5-5-3.2(b) (2), serious constitutional questions arise, and those constitutional issues will be analyzed in Part III.9
I.
A.

GENERAL APPLICATION

Statutory Scheme and Language

The statutory scheme used in imposing extended-term
sentences for exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of
wanton cruelty involves three sections of the Code. Generally, section 5-8-1 of the Code governs the length of a sentence for a defendant convicted of a felony.10 This section prescribes the following
sentencing guidelines for felonies:
Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set
by the court under this Section, according to the following limitations:
(1) for first degree murder, (a) a term shall be not less than 20
years and not more than 60 years, or (b) if the court finds that the
murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty or that any of the aggravating
factors listed in subsection (b) of Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code
of 1961 are present, the court may sentence the defendant to a
term of natural life imprisonment, or (c) if the defendant has previously been convicted of first degree murder under any state or
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(a)(1)(b) (1991).

Some courts, however, are not careful in distinguishing between sections 58-1(a)(1)(b) and 5-5-3.2(b)(2). See, e.g., People v. Kuchan, 579 N.E.2d 1054, 1058
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
6. Section 9-1(b)(7) provides the followingA defendant who at the time of the commission of the offense has attained
the age of 18 or more and who has been found guilty of first degree murder
may be sentenced to death if ... the murdered individual was under 12
years of age and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1(b)(7) (1991).
7. See infra text accompanying note 10.
8. See infra text accompanying note 103.
9. See infra text accompanying note 196.

10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1 (1991).
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federal law or is found guilty of murdering more than one victim,
the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life
imprisonment;
(2) for a person adjudged a habitual criminal under Article 33B of
the Criminal Code of 1961, as amended, the sentence shall be a
term of natural life imprisonment.
(3) except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense, for a Class X felony, the sentence shall be not less than 6
years and not more than 30 years;
(4) for a Class 1 felony, the sentence shall be not less than 4 years
and not more than 15 years;
(5) for a Class 2 felony, the sentence shall be not less than 3 years
and not more than 7 years;
(6) for a Class 3 felony, the sentence shall be not less than 2 years
and not more than 5 years;
(7) for a Class 4 felony, the11sentence shall be not less than 1 year
and not more than 3 years.

However, section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) of the Code provides the following:
The following factor may be considered by the court as [a] reason to
impose an extended-term sentence under Section 5-8-2 upon any offender:... [w]hen a defendant is convicted of any felony and the court
finds that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally
brutal or hei12
nous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.
Section 5-8-2 of the Code enumerates the length of extended-term
sentences that a trial court can impose upon a defendant convicted
of a felony when the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.13 This section
provides for the following terms of imprisonment:
A judge shall not sentence an offender to a term of imprisonment in
excess of the maximum sentence authorized by Section 5-8-1 for the
class of the most serious offense of which the offender was convicted
unless the factors in aggravation set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 55-3.2 were found to be present. Where the judge finds that such factors
were present, he may sentence an offender to the following:.
(1) for first degree murder, a term shall be not less than 60 years
and not more than 100 years;
(2) for a Class X felony, a term shall be not less than 30 years and
not more than 60 years;
(3) for a Class 1 felony, a term shall be not less than 15 years and
not more than 30 years;
11. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(a)(1) - (7) (1991).
12. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3.2(b)(2) (1991). Although trial
courts frequently find more than one factor allowing for the imposition of an
extended-term sentence, if an appellate court finds that one factor exists for
imposing an extended-term, it need not address a defendant's contention that
the other statutory factor was improperly imposed. See, e.g., People v. Benkowski, 575 N.E.2d 587, 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Jackson, 460 N.E.2d 904,
907 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); People v. Stanford, 452 N.E.2d 710, 718 (Ill. App. Ct.
1983).

13. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-2 (1991).
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(4) for a Class 2 felony, a term shall be not less than 7 years and
not more than 14 years;
(5) for a Class 3 felony, a term shall not be less than 5 years and
not more than 10 years;
(6) for a Class 4 felony,14 a term shall not be less than 3 years and
not more than 6 years.

Thus, when a defendant is convicted of a felony which the trial
court finds to be accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty, the allowable minimum sentence is the maximum sentence which could have been imposed if
the aggravating factor were not present. The maximum sentence
which can be imposed when the offense is found to be accompanied
by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior is twice as long as the
minimum sentence.
The purpose of this type of extended-term sentence is to ensure
that the punishment is appropriate, based on the particular circumstances of the case, and to ensure that society is protected from
those individuals who demonstrate by their conduct their capacity
for particularly brutal and heinous crimes which are indicative of
wanton cruelty.1 5 However, there is no requirement that the trial
court find that defendants' characters and attitudes indicate that
they are likely to commit similar crimes before the court may sentence these defendants to an extended-term of imprisonment under
section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) of the Code.1 6 Determining whether criminal
acts rise to the level of exceptionally brutal or heinous thereby allowing the possibility of an extended-term sentence is not an easy,
exact or gratifying task for any court.17 Although trial judges need
not recite the language of the statute when sentencing a defendant
to an extended-term under section 5-5-3.2(b)(2),18 they should, but

are not required to, make clear and express statements of the factors that led them to impose an extended-term sentence.1 9 The extended-term determination is based on the unique facts of each case
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-2(a)(1) - (6) (1991).
15. People v. Bedony, 527 N.E.2d 916, 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). For a good
discussion of sentencing, including imposing an extended-term sentence under
section 5-5-3.2(b)(2), see Kenneth L. Gillis, SENTENCING, ILLINOIS CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 335-86 (R. Ruebner ed., 1987).
16. People v. Hickman, 492 N.E.2d 1041, 1049 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
17. People v. Kane, 489 N.E.2d 500, 502 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
18. People v. Lekas, 508 N.E.2d 221, 238 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 942 (1988) ("However, this precise language need not be recited as a formal
incantation to justify imposition of an extended-term sentence"); People v.
Campbell, 467 N.E.2d 1112, 1132 (IM. App. Ct. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1136
(1985) (court's failure to parrot the language of the statute was not fatal to the
extended-terms imposed, when the record showed the trial court considered the
evidence indicated wanton conduct, and when the evidence does reflect such
conduct).
19. People v. Lucien, 440 N.E.2d 899, 905 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), cerL denied,
459 U.S. 1219 (1983).
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and is done on a case-by-case analysis.20
In determining whether the defendant's conduct rises to the
exceptionally brutal or heinous level, most courts start with the
language of the statute. 21 Many courts have placed great emphasis
on the word "exceptionally" 22 and when a court does so, the court
has generally found that the behavior does not meet the statutory
requirements. 23 In Peoplev. Andrews,2 4 the Illinois Supreme Court
adopted the same definitions of '"heinous" and "brutal" which were
prescribed eight years earlier in People v. LaPointe.25 The LaPointe court defined the language used in section 5-8-1(a)(1)(b) of
the Code.2 6 Adopting the definitions of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, the LaPointe court defined "heinous" as
"hatefully or shockingly evil: grossly bad: enormously and flagrantly criminal," and the LaPointe court defined "brutal" as
"grossly ruthless, devoid of mercy or compassion: cruel and cold20. People v. Sullivan, 538 N.E.2d 1376, 1380 (IM.App. Ct. 1989); People v.
Bedony, 527 N.E.2d 916, 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); People v. Hickman, 492 N.E.2d
1041,1049 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); People v. McGee, 460 N.E.2d 843, 846 (i1l.
App. Ct.
1984); People v. Strait, 451 N.E.2d 631, 634 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983); see also People v.
Taylor, 518 N.E.2d 409, 412 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); People v. Nester, 462 N.E.2d
1011, 1014 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (applying section 5-8-1(a)(1)(b) and imposing a
sentence of natural life.)
21. See People v. LaPointe, 431 N.E.2d 344 (IM.
1981) (defining "brutal" and
for imposing a sentence of natural life imprisonment under § 5-8"heinous"
l(a)(1)(b)).
It would seem clear that the language of the statute requires a finding that
the offense was accompanied by both brutal or heinous behavior which was also
indicative of wanton cruelty. See People v. Palmer, No. 69991, slip op. at 25 (IlM.
Mar. 12, 1992). However, it seems some courts do not carefully read the statutory language and blur the standard with a conjunctive interpretation. See, e.g.,
People v. Amos, 488 N.E.2d 290, 297 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985) ("[The trial judge] can
punish the offender by use of the extended-term provisions of the Unified Code
of Corrections (ILL. REv. STAT. 1983, ch. 38, par. 1005-5-3.2(b)(2)) if the murder
is exceptionally brutal or is indicative of wanton cruelty." (emphasis added)).
22. For examples of court's treatment of "exceptionally" see, People v. Anderson, 559 N.E.2d 267,271 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); People v. Fields, 555 N.E.2d 1136,
1140 (11l. App. Ct. 1990); People v. Bedony, 527 N.E.2d 916, 920 (Ill.
App. Ct.
1988); People v. Price, 511 N.E.2d 958, 963 (IlM. App. Ct. 1987); People v. Gil, 508
N.E.2d 309, 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); People v. Holiday, 474 N.E.2d 1280,1282 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1985); People v. McGee, 460 N.E.2d 843, 846 (I11.App. Ct. 1984); People
v. Fieberg, 439 N.E.2d 543, 547 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
For a good discussion of the "exceptional" requirement under section 5-81(a)(1)(b), see People v. Hattery, 539 N.E.2d 368, 397 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); People

v. Isbell, 532 N.E.2d 964, 973 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988); People v. Nester, 462 N.E.2d
1011, 1014 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984).
23. Of the ten cases emphasizing the exceptional requirement, eight have
reversed the trial court's sentence.

24. 548 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. 1989).
25. 431 N.E.2d 344 (Ill. 1981).
26. Andrews, 548 N.E.2d at 1031. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-81(a)(1)(b) (1991).
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blooded." 27 The Illinois Supreme Court has recently defined "cruelty" as "something that causes pain or suffering" or "a disposition
to inflict pain or suffering or to enjoy it being inflicted."8 The
supreme court has also stated the following about the term
"wanton:"
Ill will is not a necessary element of a wanton act. To constitute
an act wanton, the party doing the act or failing to act must be conscious of his conduct, and, though having no intent to injure, must be
conscious, from his knowledge of surrounding circumstances and existing conditions, that his conduct will naturally and probably result in
29
injury.

Under these definitions, every offense should not be converted into
30
an extraordinary offense subject to an extended-term sentence.

B.

Multiple Offenses

When a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses, the following three problems arise in applying an extended-term sentence
under section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) of the Code: (1) the most serious offense

rule,31 (2) the Evans anomalous result,3 2 and (3) multiple extendedterms.33
3 4
In People v. Jordan,
the Illinois Supreme Court held that section 5-8-2(a) allows a trial court to impose an extended-term sentence under section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) only for the offense within the
most serious class of which the defendant was convicted.3 5 In Jor-

dan, following a bench trial, the defendant was sentenced to concurrent extended-terms of imprisonment of 60 years for felony
murder by accountability and 14 years for kidnapping.3 6 The defendant claimed that the extended-term for kidnapping was improper because kidnapping was of a lesser class than felony murder,
27. Andrews, 548 N.E.2d at 1031-32. Numerous appellate court cases had
already adopted these definitions. See id. (citing numerous cases).
28. People v. Palmer, No. 69991, slip op. at 22 (Ill. March 12, 1992).
29. Id. at 22-23.
30. See People v. Evans, 429 N.E.2d 520, 525 (Ill. 1981). Almost all cases
citing Evans for this proposition have found that the behavior did not warrant
an extended-term and reversed or vacated the trial court's imposition of the
sentence. See People v. Fields, 555 N.E.2d 1136, 1140 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); People
v. Green, 532 N.E.2d 442, 446 (Ill App. Ct. 1988); People v. Price, 511 N.E.2d 958,
963 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); People v. Gil, 508 N.E.2d 309, 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987);
People v. Thomas, 486 N.E.2d 1362, 1377 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); People v. Matthews, 485 N.E.2d 403, 408 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); People v. Killen, 435 N.E.2d 789,
791 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). But see People v. Brown, 551 N.E.2d 1100, 1105 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990); People v. Johnson, 459 N.E.2d 1000, 1012 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
31. See infra text accompanying note 34.
32. See infra text accompanying note 42.
33. See infra text accompanying note 69.
34. 469 N.E.2d 569 (Ill. 1984).
35. Jordan, 469 N.E.2d at 575.
36. Id. at 571.
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and section 5-8-2(a) limits extended-terms to only the most serious
class of offense of which a defendant is convicted.3 7 The Jordan
court agreed and, relying on People v. Evans,38 concluded, "[t]he
plain language of section 5-8-2(a) requires that, when a defendant
has been convicted of multiple offenses of differing classes, an extended-term sentence may only be imposed for the conviction
within the most serious class and only if that offense was accompanied by brutal or heinous behavior."39 This rule applies only when
40
a defendant is convicted of more than one felony at the same time.
Therefore, under this rule, in showing that the defendant's behavior was exceptionally brutal or heinous indicative of wanton cruelty, the State may not rely on the nature of the defendant's actions
41
which have resulted in lesser criminal actions.
The most serious offense rule can lead to an anomalous result,
37. Id. at 575.
38. 429 N.E.2d 520 (Ill. 1981).
39. Jordan, 469 N.E.2d at 575. See People v. Green, 568 N.E.2d 92, 101 (IMl.
App. Ct. 1991) (extended-term sentence of 60 years' reduced to 30 year term);
People v. Clemons, 534 N.E.2d 676, 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (defendant's sentence
of 60 years' imprisonment reduced to 30 years because extended-term for robbery could not stand when defendant was also convicted of murder); People v.
Redisi, 527 N.E.2d 684, 691 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (defendant convicted of residential burglary, aggravated battery and home invasion; thus, extended-term could
not be imposed for offense of home invasion if exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior accompanied offense); People v. Yarbrough, 509 N.E.2d 747, 751 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987) (extended-term sentences for robbery, aggravated battery and
residential burglary could not stand when defendant also convicted of home
invasion and heinous battery); People v. Gil, 508 N.E.2d 309, 311 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987) (defendant convicted of voluntary manslaughter and concealment of
homicidal death so extended sentence could only be imposed if exceptionally
brutal or heinous acts accompanied the offense of voluntary manslaughter);
People v. Matthews, 485 N.E.2d 403,408 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (extended-term sentence for attempted rape could not stand when defendant was also convicted of
deviate sexual assault). This principle is so well recognized that the state has
even conceded to a trial court's error in imposing an extended-term. See, e.g.,
People v. Kane, 489 N.E.2d 500, 503 (fI1. App. Ct. 1986) ("However, as the State
concedes, the defendant's extended-term sentence for armed robbery must be
vacated").
40. People v. Jones, 515 N.E.2d 175, 182 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) ("Moreover, the
'class of the most serious offense of which he was convicted' language in section
5-8-2 cannot be construed to mean that the offense of which a defendant was
ever or would ever be convicted").
41. People v. Gil, 508 N.E.2d 309,311 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (state could not rely
on defendant's actions in disposing of body for imposing an extended-term for
voluntary manslaughter); People v. Holiday, 474 N.E.2d 1280, 1283 (Ill. App. Ct.
1985) ("To the extent the State attempts to rely on defendant's actions in shooting the other victims, actions for which he also received lesser criminal convictions, this reliance is improper, as it is the most serious offense which must be
accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior, and the State may
not rely on the nature of defendant's actions which have resulted in other
convictions").
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described in People v. Evans.42 The Evans anomaly occurs when a
defendant is convicted of more than one felony of differing classes
but the defendant's exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior accompanied one of the lesser felonies. Thus, a defendant who commits a felony accompanied by brutal or heinous behavior will be
insulated from an extended-term sentence under section 5-53.2(b)(2) by the mere fortuity of also being convicted of another felony of a greater class which was not accompanied by such
43
behavior.
Two cases illustrate the Evans anomaly. In People v.
Smallwood,44 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the anomalous
Evans result did not apply.45 In Smallwood, the defendant was convicted of two counts of armed robbery and one count of aggravated
battery, and the trial court sentenced him to an extended-term sentence of 50 years for one count of armed robbery, 30 years for the
second count of armed robbery to run concurrently and 5 years' imprisonment for the aggravated battery conviction to run consecutively with the other sentences. 46 The defendant and another
individual, each armed with a handgun, accosted two other men in a
doorway. 47 The defendant announced that it was a holdup, fired a
shot out the door to convince the victims that he was serious, and
struck one of the victims over the left eye when the victim informed the defendant that they had no money. 48 The victims were
ordered to lie down and, as they did, one victim took $2 and $42
worth of food stamps from his pocket and placed it in front of
him.49 The defendant picked up the food stamps and stated, "You
don't think I'll shoot you." When the victim responded that he believed the defendant would shoot him, the defendant shot the victim in the right leg below the knee. As the victim said, "Don't
shoot," the defendant shot him again through the left leg below the
knee.50 The defendant then said, "Don't tell anyone we did this to
51
you," and fled.
42. 429 N.E.2d 520 (Ill. 1981) (defendant convicted of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated battery and sentenced to an extended-term of 10 years for
the voluntary manslaughter and five years for the aggravated battery).
43. Evans, 429 N.E.2d at 525. However, a trial court may still look to the
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty in imposing a maximum non-extended sentence. See infra text accompanying note 98.

44. 464 N.E.2d 1049 (Ill. 1984).
45. Smallwood, 464 N.E.2d at 1052.
46. Id. at 1050.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id at 1050-51.
Id.
Id.
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The defendant contended that because the armed robbery, the
offense of the most serious class, was complete when he took the
money from the victim, the exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior, the shooting, accompanied the aggravated battery, not the
armed robbery. Thus, the defendant's sentence fell within the Evans anomaly.5 2 In a strained opinion, the Smallwood court found
that the armed robbery was not yet complete and, by emphasizing
the aspect of the word "accompanied," found that the defendant did
53
not fall within the anomaly.
In People v. Fiebergm the defendant was convicted of possession of burglary tools, attempted burglary, burglary, aggravated batteky and robbery. 55 He was sentenced to three years imprisonment
for possession of burglary tools, three years for attempted burglary,
seven years for burglary, five years for aggravated battery and an
extended-term of 14 years for robbery.1 During a struggle with a
police officer, the defendant maced the officer, which formed the
basis of the conviction for aggravated battery, and the trial court
relied upon this fact in sentencing the defendant to an extendedterm.5 7 The appellate court found that because robbery was the
most serious offense of which the defendant was convicted, the behavior the trial court found to be exceptionally brutal and heinous,
which took place during the aggravated battery, could not be considered in sentencing the defendant to an extended-term for the
robbery. Thus, the Evans anomaly applied.>
The general principles of the most serious offense rule and the
Evans anomaly does not apply when the defendant is sentenced to
death 59 or a term of natural life imprisonment 6° in addition to an
extended-term sentence for exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. In People v. Neal,61 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that an extended-term sentence for armed
robbery was proper even though the defendant had also been sentenced to death for murder, a more serious class of offense.62 The
Illinois Supreme Court used the following reasoning:
The statute authorizing extended-terms refers to and is bottomed on,
in a sense, the maximum sentences 'authorized by Section 5-8-1,' to
52. Id. at 1051.
53. Id. at 1052.
54. 439 N.E.2d 543 (IMI. App. Ct. 1982).
55. Fieberg,439 N.E.2d at 545.

56. Id.
57. Id. at 547.
58. Id. The court also found that the defendant's behavior was not exceptionally brutal or heinous indicative of wanton cruelty. Id. at 548.
59. People v. Neal, 489 N.E.2d 845, 855 (III. 1985).
60. People v. Young, 529 N.E.2d 497, 506 (fll. 1988).
61. 489 N.E.2d 845 (Ill. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S..1165 (1986).
62. Neal, 489 N.E.2d at 855.
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which it refers. That section refers to terms ofimprisonmentand does
not include capital sentences. Obviously a provision for an extended63
term of imprisonment would not be applicable to a sentence of death.
In People v. Young, 4 the court adopted the reasoning of Neal and
held that the authorization in section 5-8-265 to impose an extendedterm sentence in excess of the maximum sentence authorized in
section 5-8-16 cannot apply to murder convictions for which a defendant has been sentenced to natural life imprisonment under section 5-8-1. 67 Thus, the Young court held that section 5-8-2 allows a
trial court to impose an extended-term for the class of the most serious offense of which the defendant was convicted other than murder, even though the defendant was also separately sentenced to
natural life imprisonment on the murder conviction. 68
When a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses, a trial
court may sentence a defendant to multiple extended-terms in certain circumstances. In Jordan,the Illinois Supreme Court rejected
the argument that section 5-8-2(a) only allowed for an extendedterm sentence for the most serious offense of which the defendant
was convicted. 6 9 Instead, the court first emphasized the language of
section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) 70 which allows for an extended-term to be imposed upon any felony of which a defendant is convicted if that offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
indicative of wanton cruelty. 71 The Illinois Supreme Court then focused on the language of section 5-8-4(c)(2)72 which provides that
the aggregate of consecutive sentences shall not exceed the sum of
the maximum terms authorized under the extended-term provision
for the two most serious felonies involved.73 Thus, multiple extended-term sentences may be imposed.74
In combining the most serious offense rule with the Jordan
holding, for multiple extended-terms to be imposed, each of the offenses that is within the class of the most serious offense must be
accompanied by brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty.75 If extended-terms are imposed for multiple offenses and
63. Id. at 855 (emphasis in original).
64. 529 N.E.2d 497 (IMI. 1988).
65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-2 (1991).
66. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1 (1991).

67. Young, 529 N.E.2d at 505.
68. Id. at 506.
69. People v. Jordan, 469 N.E.2d 569, 576 (Ill.
1984).
70. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-5-3.2(b)(2) (1991).

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Jordan,469 N.E.2d at 576.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-4(c)(2) (1991).
Jordan,469 N.E.2d at 576.
Id.
People v. DeSimone, 439 N.E.2d 1311, 1318 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) ("Ex-

tended term sentences may be imposed for more than one offense when all of-
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the exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior does not accompany
all the offenses, then the extended-terms for those offenses not accompanied by such behavior must be vacated 76 or the sentence must
be reduced. 77 Furthermore, multiple extended-term sentences may
be imposed consecutively 78 and an extended term may be imposed
to run consecutively to a term of natural life.79
C. Mental State and Defenses
Although actions committed while defendants subjectively believe, albeit unreasonably, that they are acting in self-defense are
not exceptionally brutal or heinous indicative of wanton cruelty,80
actions resulting in a killing because of sudden and intense passion
can be exceptionally brutal or heinous.8 ' However, a trial court
may not base a maximum commitment for a defendant found guilty
but mentally ill on section 5-5-3.2(b)(2).82
In a bold statement, the Illinois Supreme Court noted, "In our
opinion, actions committed under a subjective belief, albeit unreasonable, that the actions were in self-defense do not constitute wanton cruelty. ' 83 However, Evans has not been read as establishing a
per se prohibition against the imposition of extended terms in every
voluntary manslaughter case.84 For example, the First District of
fenses are within the class of the most serious offense, and all offenses are

accompanied by brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty"); see
also People v. Campbell, 467 N.E.2d 1112, 1132 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1136 (1985) (extended-terms for armed violence and armed robbery
upheld because each offense was accompanied by brutal or heinous behavior).
76. See People v. Morgan, 492 N.E.2d 1303, 1320 (IlM. 1986) cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1101 (1987) (extended-terms for rape and aggravated kidnaping vacated because behavior accompanied murder, not rape and kidnaping).
77. People v. Green, 568 N.E.2d 92, 101 (IM. App. Ct. 1991) (extended-term
of 60 years' reduced to 30 year term pursuant to ILL. Sup. CT. R. 615(b)(4));
People v. Fields, 555 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (65 year extendedterm reduced to 40 years pursuant to ILL. SUP. CT. R. 615(b)(4)); People v.
Christy, 544 N.E.2d 88, 90 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (14 year extended-term reduced
pursuant to Rule 615(b)(4) because offense was not of the most serious class).
ILL. SUP. CT. R. 615(b)(4) provides the following- "On appeal the reviewing
court may . . . reduce the punishment imposed by the trial court." ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 11OA, para. 615(b)(4) (1991).
78. People v. Harris, 498 N.E.2d 621, 624 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (extended-terms
of 60 years for home invasion and 60 years for rape to run consecutively); People v. Wrice, 488 N.E.2d 1313, 1317 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (multiple extended-terms
of 60 years for rape and 40 years for deviate sexual assault to run consecutively
were upheld when victim was repeatedly raped, beaten and burned); see People
v. Roesler, 552 N.E.2d 1242, 1247 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 561 N.E.2d
702 (Ill. 1990) (three consecutive extended-terms of 60 years upheld).
79. People v. Waldron, 580 N.E.2d 549, 570 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
80. Evans, 87 Ill.2d at 88, 429 N.E.2d at 525.
81. People v. Lindsay, 550 N.E.2d 719, 723 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
82. Palmer,No. 69991, slip op. at 24.
83. Evans, 429 N.E.2d at 525.
84. People v. Pirrello, 565 N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
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the Appellate Court has held that a defendant can be sentenced to
an extended term for voluntary manslaughter despite an unreasonable subjective belief that the defendant was acting in self-defense
if the voluntary manslaughter was accompanied by exceptionally
brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton crueltya 5 In People
v. Moore,88 the First District concluded that in Evans the court
merely found that the defendant's behavior in that case was not
brutal or heinous, thereby reading Evans as if the supreme court
had never stated that a defendant's actions based on an unreasona-

87
ble subjective belief of self-defense could not be wantonly cruel.

However, in avoiding the propriety of the First District's interpretation of Evans, the Third District of the Appellate Court has
refused to extend the supreme court's opinion to killings involving
sudden and intense passion. 8 The Second District has similarly
held that an extended-term sentence may be imposed under section
5-5-3.2(b)(2) when a voluntary manslaughter occurs under sudden
and intense passion.8 9
The Illinois Supreme Court has recently held that a trial court
may not base a maximum commitment period for an insanity acquittee on section 5-5-3.2(b)(2).90 Focusing on the required mental
state of wantonness, the supreme court stated that the "successful
assertion of the insanity defense precludes a finding that the insanity acquittee have been conscious of his conduct such that the
requisite finding that the insanity acquittee's offense be indicative
of wanton cruelty can be made." 91 Thus, the mental state of a defendant being sentenced to an extended-term under section 5-53.2(b)(2) must be considered, and the court may not merely look to
85. People v. Moore, 513 N.E.2d 87, 90 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (defendant brutally beat a 14 year old boy who had broken into a home).
86. 513 N.E.2d 87 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989).
87. Moore, 513 N.E.2d at 90.
88. Lindsay, 550 N.E.2d at 723. See People v. Kalec, 440 N.E.2d 1254, 1257
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982); see People v. Kulpa, 430 N.E.2d 160, 169 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)
(upholding extended-term of eight years for aggravated battery when defendant was the aggressor and his actions were brutal and heinous); see also Nester,
462 N.E.2d at 1015 (applying section 5-8-1(a)(1) and holding a natural life term
may be imposed when the incident leading to the brutal or heinous behavior
began as a mutual fight).
89. Pirrello, 565 N.E.2d at 325 (defendant convicted of voluntary manslaughter for killing person suspected of killing defendant's former wife).
90. Palmer,No. 69991, slip op. at 17. Palmereffectively overruled People v.
Winston, 548 N.E.2d 406 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) and People v. Thomas, 522 N.E.2d
253 (IMl. App. Ct. 1988). Although not cited by the supreme court, at least two
previous appellate court opinions had looked to the defendant's mental state to

determine that a defendant's actions could not rise to the level of exceptionally
brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. See People v. Isbell,
532 N.E.2d 964, 974 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Green, 532 N.E.2d at 446.
91. Palmer,No. 69991, slip. op. at 24.
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the exceptional brutality or heinousness of the offense. 92
D. Extended-Term Sentence Based on Accountability
An extended-term sentence based on exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty can be imposed on a
defendant whose conviction was based upon an accountability theory. 93 In Jordan,the Illinois Supreme Court noted that section 5-53.2(b)(2) did not require that the defendant himself commit the
brutal or heinous acts and concluded that the enhanced penalty of
an extended-term sentence may be imposed upon a defendant
found guilty upon an accountability theory.94 The rationale for imposing an extended-term sentence on a defendant convicted upon
an accountability theory is that when a trial court considers imposing an extended-term sentence under section 5-5-3.2(b)(2), the trial
court's focus is on the offense committed rather than the nature of
the defendant's participation. 95
E.

Sequence of Considerations

The various districts of the Illinois Appellate Court appear to
be split as to whether a trial court should first consider factors in
aggravation and mitigation and then determine if a defendant is eligible for an extended-term under section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) of the Code
or whether a trial court should determine if an extended-term
could be properly imposed and then consider factors in aggravation
92. Id. at 24-25.
93. People v. Jordan, 469 N.E.2d 569, 580 (I. 1981) (defendant sentenced to
extended-terms of 60 years for murder and 40 years for armed robbery when
unarmed defendant participated in robbing a grocery store by restraining the
employee); see People v. Dale, 545 N.E.2d 521, 539 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (60 year
extended-term for murder imposed when defendant was not a passive ob-

server); People v. Edens, 529 N.E.2d 617, 627 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (extended-term
upheld when defendant helped plan robbery but did not shot victim); People v.
Lekas, 508 N.E.2d 221, 238-39 (IM.App. Ct. 1987) (extended-term of 45 years on
murder conviction upheld although defendant was not trigger man). Further, a
trial court can impose an extended-term on one defendant without imposing an
extended-term on another defendant. People v. Smith, 557 N.E.2d 596, 610 (Ill
App. Ct. 1990).

94. People v. Jordan, 469 N.E.2d 569, 580 (IMl. 1984).
95. People v. Rixie, 546 N.E.2d 52, 61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (extended-term of
60 years for felony murder upheld when defendant and another stabbed victim

numerous times); People v. Johnson, 476 N.E.2d 1321, 1325 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)

(extended-term for participation in rape and robbery although defendant did

not kill victim); People v. Rogers, 461 N.E.2d 511, 517 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (extended-term of 65 years on murder conviction upheld although defendant only
convicted as an accomplice); People v. Gray, 408 N.E.2d 1150, 1158 (Ill. App. Ct.
1980) (extended-term upheld when defendant found legally accountable for all
offenses).
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and mitigation. In People v. Killen,96 the Fourth District of the Illinois Appellate Court held that a trial court could not look to section
5-5-3.2(b)(2) when imposing a nonextended-term sentence and
stated, "in imposing a sentence, the court is to consider the factors
in aggravation and mitigation, and then, and only then, may the
court consider whether an extended-term sentence should be imposed because the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal
or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty." 97 However, the
Killen holding that the trial court cannot consider brutal or heinous
behavior in imposing a nonextended-term sentence has been recently overruled,98 but the question as to the sequence of considerations has not been fully resolved.
Although by its very definition section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) is a factor
in aggravation, this only begs the question because the problem involves the sequence of considerations. It would seem that either
approach is appropriate if the trial court carefully distinguishes
which facts are applicable to the finding of exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior and which facts are considered in aggravation and
mitigation. What must be avoided is the blurring of the factors in
mitigation and the factors in aggravation other than the exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior with the factors that show exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior. For example, the People v.
Bedony 99 court found that the defendant's behavior was not exceptionally brutal or heinous and in doing so considered the defendant's family background, his education, his work record, his lack of
drug or alcohol abuse, and his lack of criminal history.' ° ° Although
these factors are appropriate considerations in imposing the length
of the sentence, none of these factors in mitigation have anything to
do with the offense committed, which is the focus of the trial court's
determination in imposing an extended-term under section 5-53.2(b)(2),1 0 1 and should not be considered in imposing an extendedterm sentence. Therefore, the People v. Angelly court was correct
when it stated, "Nor does it matter ... that the court first determined whether defendant was eligible for extended-term provisions
96. 435 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (trial court cannot consider exception-

ally brutal or heinous behavior in sentencing a defendant to the maximum
nonextended term).
97. Killen, 435 N.E.2d at 790.
98. People v. Compton, 550 N.E.2d 640, 643 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); see People v.
Willis, 569 N.E.2d 113, 119 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Duncan, 553 N.E.2d 774,
776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); People v. Butts, 481 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Ill. App. Ct. 19S5)

(trial court can consider exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior when imposing defendant to maximum nonextended term).
99. 527 N.E.2d 916 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (defendant's extended-term for attempted murder reduced to 30 years when court found no exceptionally brutal
or heinous behavior).
100. Bedony, 527 N.E.2d at 921.
101. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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and then examined factors in aggravation and mitigation, as opposed to doing it in reverse order." 10 2 Under either approach, the
court should only consider those factors appropriate to each
determination.
F.

Review of Extended-Term Sentences: Standard of Review
and Waiver

An abuse of discretion standard of review is used to determine
whether the trial court properly found that the defendant was eligible for an extended-term sentence pursuant to section 5-53.2(b)(2). 10 3 The same standard is used when determining whether
a sentence imposed under section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) is excessive. 104 The
rationale for applying this standard is that a trial judge, not a reviewing court, is in a superior position during trial and the sentencing hearing to consider and determine the punishment to be
imposed.105
Although the general rule is that if a defendant fails to object
at the time of sentencing to the imposition of an extended-term sentence pursuant to section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) and fails to raise the issue in
a motion for a new trial, the defendant waives the issue on appeal, 1°6 several exceptions exist. First, if a motion for a new trial
has been filed, heard and denied prior to the sentencing, then the
102. People v. Angelly, 521 N.E.2d 306, 312 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (defendant
sentenced to two extended-terms of 30 years for attempted murder and armed
robbery to be served concurrently).
103. People v. Andrews, 548 N.E.2d 1025, 1031 (Ill. 1989) (behavior during
robbery not exceptionally brutal or heinous). Because the determination to impose an extended-term is a discretionary matter for the trial court, it need not
be alleged in the charging instrument. See People v. Turner, 416 N.E.2d 1149,
1154 (M11.
App. Ct. 1980).
104. Andrews, 548 N.E.2d at 1031.
105. People v. Cabrera, 508 N.E.2d 708, 716 (Ill. 1987) (extended-term of 60
years for murder not an abuse of discretion); People v. Roesler, 552 N.E.2d 1242,
1247 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (three consecutive extended-term sentences of 60 years'
for two counts of rape and one count of deviate sexual criminal assault upheld
because "[a] reviewing court must give great deference to the trial court's determination and will not modify or vacate a sentence absent abuse of discretion.");
People v. Smith, 520 N.E.2d 841, 846 (ll. App. Ct. 1988) (two extended-terms of
55 years to run concurrently for attempted murder and armed robbery not
abuse of discretion).
People v. James, 514 N.E.2d 998, 1004 (Ill. 1987), is a good example of how
deferential a reviewing court can be when determining that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. In James, the
supreme court stated, "We do not think this determination should be set aside
simply because we may have, if we were the sentencing judge and had an opportunity to assess these same sentencing factors, arrived at a different determination." I&i
106. People v. Neal, 489 N.E.2d 845, 855 (Ill. 1985); see also People v. Sperow,
525 N.E.2d 223, 232 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (defendant improperly contended for
first time on appeal that trial court considered improper factor in sentencing);
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issue is not waived because the defendant is under no duty to file a
post-sentencing motion asking for a new sentencing hearing to preserve the alleged error.10 7 Second, although a defendant fails to object at the sentencing hearing, the error may be preserved under
the plain error doctrine.'0 8 Finally, although courts previously
found that failure to challenge the constitutionality of section 5-53.2(b)(2) in the trial court waives the issue,1°9 pursuant to People v.
Bryant,110 the constitutionality of section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) can be raised
at any time."'
II.

FACTORS IN IMPOSING EXTENDED-TERMS UNDER
SECTION

5-5-3.2(b)(2)

Several factors have been considered in determining when a
defendant's offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty, thereby allowing for
the imposition of an extended-term under section 5-5-3.2(b)(2).
Those factors 1 2 include the following: the relationship of the dePeople v. Morrison, 484 N.E.2d 329, 340 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (issue waived on
appeal for failure to object and raise issue in post-trial motion).
107. People v. Redisi, 527 N.E.2d 684, 691 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (allowing defendant to raise for first time correctness of imposing extended-term on appeal).
However, if a defendant pleads guilty and only wishes to raise the issue of
the appropriateness of the sentence imposed, the defendant must file a written
motion to reconsider sentence in the trial court and failure to do so results in
dismissal of the appeal because the appellate court lacks jurisdiction. People v.
Wallace, 570 N.E.2d 334, 335 (Ill. 1991); see also People v. Ishmon, 572 N.E.2d
383, 385 (111. App. Ct. 1991) ("We conclude, therefore, that defendant's filing of a
Rule 604(d) motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which did not raise any sentencing issues, cannot act to meet the jurisdictional requirement of a motion to reconsider sentence.").
108. People v. Martin, 519 N.E.2d 884, 886 (Ill. 1988); People v. Lighthall, 530
N.E.2d 81, 84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); People v. Redisi, 527 N.E.2d 684, 691 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1988); cf.People v. Chandler, 578 N.E.2d 155, 157 (IMI. App. Ct. 1991) (defendant failed to object to the class X sentence at sentencing hearing or post-trial
motion, but this did not waive the issue); People v. Washington, 552 N.E.2d 1067,
1072 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that when the State attempts to sentence a
defendant as a repeat offender thereby requiring defendant to be sentences as a
Class X offender, the issue is one of the sufficiency of the evidence and therefore is not waived).
109. People v. Cartalino, 444 N.E.2d 662, 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); People v.
Clark, 429 N.E.2d 1255, 1261 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); People v. Smith, 418 N.E.2d 172,
178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
110. 539 N.E.2d 1221 (Ill. 1989).
111. People v. Hernandez, 562 N.E.2d 219, 228 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (defendant's argument that § 5-5-3.2(6)(2) violated Eighth Amendment could be raised
for first time on appeal); People v. Page, 550 N.E.2d 248, 251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(defendant could raise on review the issue of the constitutionality of § 5-53.2(b)(2) and whether it violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
112. Although I have attempted to compile all the factors courts have considered, this enumeration may not be an exclusive list of factors which courts have
considered as showing exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior because under
the facts of each case, the courts focus on what they determine to be indicative
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fendant to the victim; 11 3 the helpless nature of the victim;114 the
lack of remorse shown by the defendant; 115 the emotional trauma
inflicted upon the victim;116 the premeditation of the offense; 1 7 the
torture involved;:" s and the force employed in committing the felony. 119 Although courts have considered the defendant's prior
criminal record in determining whether an offense was exceptionally brutal or heinous, consideration of this factor is improper.' 2 0
Finally, courts cannot consider an element of the offense as a factor
in determining if an extended-term may be imposed.' 2 '
A.

Relationship

As a factor in finding a defendant's behavior exceptionally brutal or heinous, several courts consider the relationship of the defendant to the victim of the offense. The fact that the victim was a
friend or acquaintance has been found to be a factor showing exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.2 2
Similarly, an offense committed against a family member has also
been found to be a factor in showing exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior.2S
of wanton cruelty. For example, a few courts have found that the place where
the felony took place to be an appropriate factor in showing brutal or heinous
behavior. See People v. Bishop, 534 N.E.2d 401,404 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); People v.
McGee, 460 N.E.2d 843, 847 (IMI. App. Ct. 1984); People v. Beamon, 572 N.E.2d

1011, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).

113. See infra text accompanying note 122.
114. See infra text accompanying note 124.
115. See infra text accompanying note 139.
116. See infra text accompanying note 149.
117. See infra text accompanying note 159.
118. See infra text accompanying note 175.
119. See infra text accompanying note 180.
120. See infra text accompanying note 184.
121. See infra text accompanying note 193.
122. See, e.g., People v. Kuchan, 579 N.E.2d 1054, 1059 (InI. App. Ct. 1991)
(defendant choked pregnant wife to death); People v. Angelly, 521 N.E.2d 306,
312 (IMI. App. Ct. 1988) (attempted murder and robbery of longtime acquaintance); People v. Holiday, 474 N.E.2d 1280, 1283 (IM1.App. Ct. 1985) (murder,
armed robbery and aggravated battery of "gambling buddies"); People v. Sias,
415 N.E.2d 618, 624-25 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (aggravated battery of victim defendant knew for two years). See also People v. Duncan, 553 N.E.2d 774, 776 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990) (36 year nonextended term imposed for murder of girlfriend).
123. See People v. Clemons, 534 N.E.2d 676, 680 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (murder
and armed robbery of father); People v. Franklin, 512 N.E.2d 40,44 (111. App. Ct.
1987) ("In the case at bar, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to
conclude that Franklin's killing of her defenseless child was wanton and exceptionally brutal behavior and thus to impose an extended-term sentence"); People v. Williams, 480 N.E.2d 205, 210 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (murder of niece); People
v. Cox, 446 N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) ("there could be no doubt that
all the defendant's harmful actions were purposefully and directly aimed at her
own child"); see also People v. Nelson, 565 N.E.2d 123, 129 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(murder of stepson, applying section 5-8-1(a)(1));'People v. Barkauskas, 497
N.E.2d 1183, 1192 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (murder of wife, applying section 5-8-
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B. Helpless Nature of Victim
Courts recognize the helpless nature of the victim as a factor in
determining whether exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior exists. 12 4 Included in this category is age. Courts have found that the
fact that offenses were committed against not only children 125 but
also elderly individuals 126 is a factor in showing brutal or heinous
behavior. Because age is a separate aggravating factor under different sections of the Code,'127 courts must be careful not to mix the
age of the victim as a separate aggravating factor under those sections with age as a factor in finding exceptionally brutal or heinous
1(a)(1)); People v. Hudson, 420 N.E.2d 271, 274 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (murder of
family members, applying § 5-8-1(a)(1)).
124. But see infra text accompanying notes 236-243 (discussing the new
trend in the case law such as People v. Andrews, 548 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. 1989),
which recognized that many victims are defenseless).
125. See People v. McDonald, 545 N.E.2d 819, 823-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (60
year extended-term imposed for murder of child); People v. Freeman, 538
N.E.2d 681, 684 (InI. App. Ct. 1989) (60 year extended-term imposed for aggravated criminal sexual assault of five-year-old); People v. Franklin, 512 N.E.2d
40, 44 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (eight year extended-term imposed for murder of
three-year-old); People v. Williams, 480 N.E.2d 205, 210 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (50
year extended-term imposed for murder of 13-year-old); People v. Strait, 451
N.E.2d 631, 634 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (60 year extended-term imposed for rape of
six-year-old); People v. Cox, 446 N.E.2d 1280, 1282 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (10 year
extended-term sentence for involuntary manslaughter of four-year-old); People
v. Turner, 416 NE.2d 1149, 1155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (rape and deviate sexual
assault of 19 year-old).
A few courts have also focused on the age of the offender in finding that the
offense was not brutal or heinous. See Freeman 538 N.E.2d at 684; People v.
Olesch, 492 N.E.2d 1381, 1391 (MII. App. Ct. 1986) (defendant 27 years old at time
of sentencing for rape and deviate sexual assault). The propriety of focusing on
the age of the defendant is questionable if done so to determine wh-,ether the
offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior; however,
the age of the offender is a proper consideration as a general factor in mitigation. Again, the separate consideration of specific factors is the important aspect. See supra text accompanying note 99.
126. People v. Beamon, 572 N.E.2d 1011, 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); see People
v. Brown, 540 N.E.2d 500, 505 (IIl. App. Ct. 1989) (two 50-year, concurrent, extended-term sentences imposed for offenses on 69-year-old woman); People v.
Smith, 520 N.E.2d 841, 846 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (55-year extended-term imposed
for attempted murder and armed robbery of 68-year-old); People v. Yarbrough,
509 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (extended-term for offense committed
against elderly woman); People v. Lekas, 508 N.E.2d 221, 238-39 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987) (45 year extended-term imposed for murder of elderly individual); People
v. Harris, 498 N.E.2d 621, 624 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (extended-term of 60 years
imposed for home invasion and rape of 79-year-old woman); see also People v.
Butts, 481 N.E.2d 987, 989 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (maximum nonextended-term imposed when offense against elderly man was found to be brutal and heinous).
127. Sections 5-5-3.2(b)(4)(i) and (ii) provide the following:
The following factors may be considered by the court as reasons to impose
an extended-term sentence under Section 5-8-2 upon any offender: When a
defendant is convicted of any felony committed against: (i) a person under
12 years of age at the time of the offense; (ii) a person 60 years of age or
older at the time of the offense.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 1005-5-3.2(b)(4)(i),(ii) (1991).
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behavior, thereby committing double enhancement.' 28 While sevageral courts have been careful in distinguishing age as a separate
130
gravating factor,' 2 9 other courts have not been so careful.
Also included in this category is the "left for dead" factor.
Leaving or abandoning victims so that the victims are unable to protect themselves or survive has been considered to be a factor which
shows exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.' 3 ' This "left for dead" factor is perplexing because, in
most instances, such as murder, attempted murder or manslaughter, it would seem very unlikely for the defendant to attempt to
render aid to the victim. 132 Similar to the "left for dead" factor, the
fact that the victim was bound or gagged has been considered an
appropriate factor in determining exceptionally brutal or heinous
33
behavior.1
128. See People v. Hobbs, 427 N.E.2d 558 (ill.
1981); People v. Gray, 460
N.E.2d 354, 356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
129. People v. Benkowski, 575 N.E.2d 587, 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v.
Yarbrough, 509 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987); People v. Lekas, 508 N.E.2d

221, 238 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987).
130. People v. Bell, 577 N.E.2d 1228, 1249 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991); People v. Beamon, 572 N.E.2d 1011, 1017 (111. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Brown, 540 N.E.2d 569,
505 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989); People v. Freeman, 538 N.E.2d 681, 684 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989); People v. Smith, 520 N.E.2d 841, 846 (IlM.App. Ct. 1989).
131. People v. Stewart, 577 N.E.2d 527,528 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Harvey, 571 N.E.2d 1186, 1188 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) ("The bodies of [the victims] were
left in the field."); People v. Barfield, 543 N.E.2d 812, 819 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)
("[D]efendant made no attempt to help the victim."); People v. Angelly, 521
N.E.2d 306, 312 (IlM. App. Ct. 1988) (dropped victim off in an isolated area with
little chance for getting help); People v. Smith, 520 N.E.2d 841, 846 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989) ("leaving him for dead"); People v. Hickman, 492 N.E.2d 1041, 1049 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986) (defendant repeatedly checked victim's body in an attempt to
determine whether she was dead and not in an attempt to administer aid to
her); see People v. Nester, 462 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984) (applying

§ 5-8-1(a)(1) and stating "Here, defendant simply walked away from the victim

after inflicting the knife wound and made no attempt to help him."); see also
People v. Yarbrough, 509 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (refusing to help
victim after throwing caustic substance in victim's face). Cf People v. Waldron,
580 N.E.2d 549, 570 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991) (defendant prevented another person
from aiding victim); People v Kuchan, 579 N.E.2d 1054, 1059 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991)
(after choking pregnant wife to death, defendant left body in bathroom for over
three days while he "partied with cocaine"). But see People v. Gil, 508 N.E.2d
309, 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (prevented individual from calling for help and
waited for victim to die but no extended-term imposed).
132. But see People v. Cox, 446 N.E.2d 1280 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983) (mother convicted of involuntary manslaughter brought the victim to the hospital; yet, the
court still found under the totality of the circumstances that the behavior was
exceptionally brutal and heinous).
133. People v. Williams, 581 N.E.2d 228, 236 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (defendant
kept victim bound and taped for several hours); People v. Rixie, 546 N.E.2d 52,
61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (victim bound and gagged); People v. Dale, 545 N.E.2d 521,
539 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (cord used to tie victim); People v. Brown, 540 N.E.2d
500, 505 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989) (victim bound at feet and hands); People v. Lekas,
508 N.E.2d 221, 238 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (victim bound and gagged); People v.
Wilson, 485 N.E.2d 1264, 1274 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (victims were tied up); People
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Finally, other factors which have been considered as showing
brutal or heinous behavior because of the helpless nature of the vic134
is unarmed, 135
tim are the fact that the victim begs for mercy,
intoxicated, 13 6 mentally handicapped' 3 7 or does not provoke the

offense.

138

C. Lack of Remorse
In People v. LaPointe,139 the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
the imposition of a natural life sentence under section 5-8-1(a)(1)140
for a murder which was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. In that case, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the defendant's callous attitude and
complete lack of remorse, shown by wearing a tee shirt which
stated "Elmhurst Executioner" following the arrest and while bev. Rogers, 461 N.E.2d 511, 517 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984) (victim bound); People v.
Piontkowski, 397 N.E.2d 36, 37 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979) (employees of store which
defendant robbed were tied up). Piontkowski is probably not good law today
for at least two reasons: first, it did not apply the recognized definitions of "brutal" and "heinous" and second, it clearly conflicts with the new trend of case
law shown by Andrews. See infra text accompanying note 234.
134. People v. Harvey, 571 N.E.2d 1186, 1188 (IMl. App. Ct. 1991) (victim
pleaded with defendants not to hurt her); People v. Angelly, 521 N.E.2d 306, 312
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (victim repeatedly begged for mercy); People v. Buford, 533
N.E.2d 472,480 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (victim cried "Oh, no" right before defendant
shot); see also People v. Sullivan, 538 N.E.2d 1376, 1379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (applying § 5-8-1(a)(1) when defendant ignored all pleas for mercy while shooting
victim in back).
135. People v. Bishop, 534 N.E.2d 401, 404 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989) ("senseless and
brutal murder of an innocent and unarmed citizen"); People v. McGee, 460
N.E.2d 843, 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (unarmed victim); People v. Kulpa, 430
N.E.2d 164, 169 (Il.App. Ct. 1981) (unarmed victim). This factor standing alone
is very questionable because, again, most victims are unarmed. This factor
would seem appropriate only when the circumstances showed that both parties
were violent or when there was a mutual fight.
136. People v. Cain, 525 N.E.2d 1194, 1200 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (victim intoxicated and unable to defend himself); People v. Strait, 451 N.E.2d 631, 634 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1983) (defendant got victim intoxicated before rape).
137. People v. Franklin, 512 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (finding that
victim was "slow" made "the crime appear to be more cruel").
138. People v. Edens, 529 N.E.2d 617, 625 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988) (victim did not
provoke shooting during armed robbery); People v. Johnson, 513 N.E.2d 852, 859
(Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (defendant robbed three men at gunpoint and then shot victim without provocation); People v. McGee, 460 N.E.2d 843, 847 (IlM. App. Ct.
1984) (no immediate provocation); People v. Grady, 438 N.E.2d 608, 614 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1982) (unprovoked attack); see also People v. Daniel, 548 N.E.2d 354,
363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); People v. Nester, 462 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (In. App. Ct.
1984) (applying § 5-8-1(a)(1) and finding that victim came to aid of woman
whom defendant was beating). But see People v. Bedony, 527 N.E.2d 916, 920-21
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (no finding of brutal or heinous behavior); People v. Kane,
489 N.E.2d 500, 503 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (not finding brutal or heinous behavior
even though murder was unprovoked).
139. 431 N.E.2d 344 (Ill. 1981).
140. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-8-1(a)(1) (1991).
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ing held in the county jail, indicated that the sentence was
141
appropriate.
In imposing an extended-term sentence under section 5-53.2(b)(2) of the Code, the Illinois Supreme Court again found that
remorse is an appropriate consideration, 142 and might, in fact, require that a trial court make a determination that the defendant
lacked remorse before an extended-term may be imposed. 143 Generally, if a defendant is remorseful for the offense, the courts have
found that the behavior did not rise to the level of exceptionally
brutal or heinous. 144 When a defendant is not remorseful for the
offense, the courts have generally found that the imposition of an
extended-term was appropriate. 14 5 However, a defendant can show
remorse and still be sentenced to an extended-term sentence under
section 5-5-3.2(b)(2),146 particularly if the defendant shows remorse
not for the offense but for being apprehended, 47 or if the defendant
shows remorse but the trial court does not believe the defendant. 148
141. People v. LaPointe, 431 N.E.2d 344, 353 (IlM. 1981). See also People v.
Nelson, 571 N.E.2d 879, 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (natural life term upheld when

applying § 5-8-1(a)(1) when court found no remorse because defendant asked

police, "Is the sucker.., dead yet?").
142. People v. Andrews, 548 N.E.2d 1025, 1032 (Ill. 1989).
143. See People v. Curtis, 566 N.E.2d 324, 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (appellate
court reversed and remanded with directions that the trial court consider the
lack of remorse of the defendant, if any, in light of the Andrews decision). See
infra text accompanying note 235.
144. People v. Andrews, 548 N.E.2d 1025, 1032 (Ill. 1989); People v. Verser,
558 N.E.2d 226, 233 (Il. App. Ct. 1990); People v. Green, 532 N.E.2d 442, 446 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988); People v. Price, 511 N.E.2d 958, 964 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); People v.
Kane, 489 N.E.2d 500, 503 (IMI. App. Ct. 1986).
145. See, e.g., People v. Pirrello, 565 N.E.2d 324, 330 (IlI. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Barfield, 543 N.E.2d 812, 819 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Edens, 529
N.E.2d 617, 627 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); People v. Johnson, 513 N.E.2d 852, 859 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1987); see also People v. Daniel, 548 N.E.2d 354, 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989);
People v. Sullivan, 538 N.E.2d 1376, 1379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); People v. Taylor,
518 N.E.2d 409, 413 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); People v. Nester, 462 N.E.2d 1011, 1015
(Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (applying § 5-8-1(a)(1)).
The court should be careful, however, because when defendants protest
their innocence, they will probably not admit that they are sorry but may still
be remorseful for what happened to the victim. See People v. Buchanan, 570
N.E.2d 344, 357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). But see People v. Ward, 499 N.E.2d 422, 426
(Ill. 1986) (under some circumstances, a continued protestation of innocence
and the lack of remorse may convey a strong message to a trial judge that the
defendant is a liar).
146. People v. Bishop, 534 N.E.2d 401, 404 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
147. People v. Hickman, 492 N.E.2d 1041, 1049 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); cf. People
v. McDade, 579 N.E.2d 1173, 1183 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (expression of remorse was
"somewhat ambivalent").
148. People v. Waldron, 580 N.E.2d 549, 570 (Ill. App. Ct: 1991) (crimes commited by defendant indicated a total lack of conscience or response, in the
court's opinion); People v. Benkowski, 575 N.E.2d 587, 591 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991);
People v. McGee, 460 N.E.2d 843, 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (trial court in superior
position; however, trial court must still act within discretion).

The John Marshall Law Review

D.

[Vol. 25:491

Threats and Emotional Trauma

In imposing an extended-term under section 5-5-3.2(b)(2), several courts focus on the defendants' threats against the victims 149
and the emotional trauma resulting from the offenses 50° or the
threats.1 5 ' Courts are permitted to consider mental suffering in imposing an extended-term sentence because "[c]ommon experience
teaches that the subjective pain of mental injury often exceeds that
' 52
of physical injury, and the intangible scars may be as lasting."'
However, threats and emotional trauma are murky factors in
imposing extended-terms, particularly in cases involving sexual offenses. For example, in People v. Jackson,15 3 the court upheld the
imposition of an extended-term based on an emotional trauma,
finding that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. In Jackson, the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of rape 1-4 based on the following facts. After making a call at a public phone booth, the
defendant grabbed the victim by the arm and forced her into a
parking lot. The defendant pulled down his pants and ordered the
victim to perform oral sex. When she refused, the defendant
slapped her and then she engaged in oral sex. When the victim
screamed, the defendant slapped her, pulled her into an alley and
forced her to perform oral sex. He then brought the victim to the
front porch of a building and raped her. The defendant then took
her around the back of the building, where he again raped the
155
victim.
149. See People v. Willaims, 581 N.E.2d 228, 236 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (victim

threatened and terrorized for several hours); People v. Angelly, 521 N.E.2d 306,
312 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988) (defendant told victim that if victim told anybody about

the offense, he would kill him); People v. Jones, 515 N.E.2d 166, 175 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1987) (threatened to kill victims and their families and burn down their
businesses); People v. Campbell, 467 N.E.2d 1112, 1133 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984) (de-

fendant would "blow [them] away" if victims did not do what they were told);
People v. Turner, 416 N.E.2d 1149, 1155 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (victim repeatedly

threatened with death).
150. People v. Timmons, 469 N.E.2d 646, 652 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1984); People v.

Hamilton, 401 N.E.2d 318, 323 (IM.App. Ct. 1980) (severe emotional trauma to
the victim). But see People v. Redisi, 527 N.E.2d 684, 692 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)

(acknowledging that emotional trauma was an appropriate factor to consider,
stated that emotional trauma alone may not be enough to establish that the
offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative
of wanton cruelty).
151. People v. Clark, 429 N.E.2d 1255, 1263 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1981) (court focused

on "the threat of death, with its concomitant mental anguish," as a significant
factor).
152. Id.

153. 460 N.E.2d 904 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
154. Jackson, 460 N.E.2d at 906.
155. Id. at 907.
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However, in People v. Killen,15 6 the court found that the deviate sexual assault was not accompanied by exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty even though the
court recognized that the victim suffered deep emotional scars. In
Killen, the victim was a clerk at a convenience store. At about 4
a.m., the defendant entered the store, came up from behind the victim and stuck something in her back which she thought was a knife.
After forcing her to give him the money in the cash register, the
defendant ordered her into the storage room where the defendant
told her to disrobe. The defendant then ordered her to bend over
and he attempted to penetrate her but was unable to do so. The
defendant then forced her to perform oral sex. The defendant then
again attempted to have intercourse with her but was unable to
penetrate her. The defendant then had her perform oral sex again.
The defendant threatened to cut her if she did not comply. After
completion of oral sex, the defendant fled from the store via an
57
emergency door.'
Therefore, two courts reached opposite conclusions as to
whether the offense was exceptionally brutal or heinous so as to
impose an extended-term despite the similar facts. These contradictory findings exemplify the random nature in applying section 55-3.2(b)(2). These cases are factually almost identical yet the courts
reached opposite conclusions. This result raises serious questions as
to whether section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) is unconstitutionally vague. 158
E.

Premeditation

Premeditation is an appropriate factor for courts to consider in
determining whether an offense was accompanied by exceptionally
brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty 59 Generally, if the offense was premeditated, then it will be characterized as
exceptionally brutal or heinous. 60 If the offense is not premeditated, then it will not be characterized as brutal or heinous.' 6 ' An
extended-term may be imposed based on premeditation even
though the defendant disputes that the offense was
156. 435 N.E.2d 789 (M11.
App. Ct. 1982).
157. Killen, 435 N.E.2d at 789-90.
158. See infra text accompanying note 205.
159. See People v. LaPointe, 431 N.E.2d 344, 353 (Ill. 1981) (defendant told
third-party that he would kill a cab driver).
160. See infra note 163.

161. People v. Andrews, 548 N.E.2d 1025, 1032 (Ill. 1989); People v. Isbell, 532

N.E.2d 964, 973 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); People v. Thomas, 486 N.E.2d 1362, 1378 (Ill.

App. Ct. 1985) (although robbery was planned, premeditation factor was diminished because defendants were unable to complete robbery when they realized
that the victim was dead). But see People v. Bedony, 527 N.E.2d 916, 920-21 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988) (premeditated but not found to be brutal or heinous).
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premeditated. 162
Premeditation is shown in two ways. Premeditation can exist
in the classic sense, such as when the defendant has planned a
course of action. 163 For example, in People v. Curtis,164 the court
held that an extended-term was proper because of the premeditation involved. In Curtis, the defendants, for no logical reason, decided to shoot a police officer. The defendants placed a prank
phone call to lure the officer to the area, hid and waited for the
officer to arrive and, when the officer arrived, the defendant shot
him.165 Premeditation can also exist when the defendant's actions
are calculated but not planned in any particular manner. 166 For example, in People v. McGee,167 the court found defendant's actions to
be premeditated when during a fight, although initially unarmed,
defendant was handed a rifle, and he used the rifle to shoot the
168
victim.
Constitutional questions again arise as to the validity of section
5-5-3.2(b)(2) because courts faced with similar facts showing premeditation can readily reach opposite conclusions as to whether an
169
extended-term sentence may be imposed. In People v. Bishop,
the court found that an extended-term was appropriate under section 5-5-3.2(b) (2) because premeditation was shown by the following
facts. The defendant and co-defendant decided to "make some 'fast
money'" by robbing somebody at an elevated train station. The de162. People v. McGee, 460 N.E.2d 843, 846 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
163. See People v. Benkowski, 575 N.E.2d 587,590-91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Brown, 551 N.E.2d 1100, 1106 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (defendant kept gun in
car to use if officer ever stopped him and when one did, defendant shot the
officer); People v. Fyke, 546 N.E.2d 1101, 1107 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (planned murder of rival drug dealer); People v. Barfield, 543 N.E.2d 812, 819 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989) (planned robbery of victim); People v. Pena, 528 N.E.2d 325, 329 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1988) (planned murder of rival gang member); People v. Hickman, 492
N.E.2d 1041,1049 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (defendant repeatedly told co-workers that
he was going to turn-the-town-on-its-ear, they would have something to talk
about, defendant had Plan A and Plan B); People v. Sias, 415 N.E.2d 618, 624-25
(Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (defendant waited for and shot co-worker for reporting poor
work performance).
164. 546 N.E.2d 624 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
165. Curtis, 546 N.E.2d at 630. Although this decision was reversed on the
appeal after remand in People v. Curtis, 566 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), the
court reaffirmed its finding that premeditation made the offense exceptionally
brutal or heinous indicative of wanton cruelty.
166. See People v. Johnson, 513 N.E.2d 852, 859 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) and People v. Nester, 462 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (1984) in which the court, in upholding a
sentence of natural life imprisonment pursuant to § 5-8-1(a)(1), found that the
offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative
of wanton cruelty because during a fight, as the victim was falling to the
ground, the defendant fatally stabbed the victim. See also Pirrello,565 N.E.2d
at 330 (Reinhard, J., specially concurring.).
167. 460 N.E.2d 843 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
168. Id- at 846.
169. 534 N.E.2d 401 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
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fendant showed the co-defendant a revolver, which was eventually
used. During the robbery, the defendant placed the revolver
against the head of the victim and shot her?' 0 In affirming the imposition of the extended-term, the Bishop court noted the fact that
the defendants conspired to rob an unsuspecting victim showed that
the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty.17 1
However, in People v. Kane,172 the court held that the offense
was not accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior
resulting from premeditation despite the following facts. In that
case, the defendant and co-defendant talked about robbing a taxicab
driver and killing some rival street gang members. The defendants
took a gun, entered a cab, announced a "stickup," shot the driver in
the neck, took the driver's money and fled. 1 73 The Kane court
found that the behavior was not exceptionally brutal or heinous to
warrant and extended-term. 174 Although the defendant in Kane
showed some remorse, that one distinguishing factor is minor in
comparison to the factual similarities of these cases.
F.

Torture

Although an offense need not involve torture or infliction of
unnecessary pain to rise to the level of exceptionally brutal or heinous, 17 5 extended-terms may be imposed if the court finds that the
offense was torturous.1 7 6 For example, in People v. Wrice,177 the
court upheld the imposition of a 60-year extended-term for rape
and a 40-year extended-term for deviate sexual assault based on
"the torture-like conduct engaged in by the defendant."'178 In that
case, the victim was repeatedly raped, beaten and burned. There
were over 100 bruises on the victim's body and 20% of the victim's
body had been burned with an iron.179 Clearly, an extended-term
170. Id at 402.

171. Id. at 404.
172. 489 N.E.2d 500 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
173. Id, at 501.

174. Id. at 502. Cf. People v. Page, 550 N.E.2d 248, 252 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(court declined to follow Kane in case of premeditated murder of limousine
driver by firing two shots at close range to back of head).
175. People v. Abernathy, 545 N.E.2d 201, 217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); see People
v. LaPointe, 431 N.E.2d 344, 353 (Ill. 1981). But see People v. Lucas, 548 N.E.2d

1003, 1022 (Ill. 1989) (Illinois Supreme Court, in applying § 9-1(b) (7), found that
the death penalty was not appropriate because the murder was not premeditated, prolonged or torturous). See infra note 207.
176. People v. Isbell, 532 N.E.2d 964, 973 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); People v.
Bedony, 527 N.E.2d 916, 920 (Ill. App. Ct.. 1988); People v. Nester, 462 N.E.2d
1011, 1014 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
177. 488 N.E.2d 1313 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
178. Id,at 1317."
179. Id.
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sentence may be imposed under section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) when the offense involves torture.
G.

Force Employed in Committing Felony

A trial court may consider the amount and type of force employed and the manner in which the offense was completed in imposing an extended-term sentence.18 0 However, when a court
considers this factor, courts generally do so in a very inarticulate
way. For example, courts have mentioned that it reviewed the file,
particularly photographs of the victim and found that an extended18 1
term was appropriate.
One way in which courts articulate how a felony rises to the
level of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty is to emphasize the number of wounds the victim received.1 8 2 Although a large number of wounds can show
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior allowing for the imposition of an extended-term, a single act or wound may be sufficient to
allow a trial court to impose an extended-term section 5-5180. See People v. Torry, 571 N.E.2d 827, 835-36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (while

stabbing victim, defendant used such force that handle of knife broke); People

v. Harvey, 568 N.E.2d 381, 387 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (defendant stated that he beat
the deceased until her head sounded like a hollow watermelon); People v. Pirrello, 565 N.E.2d 324, 330 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (excessive firepower unleashed on
victim when "shot blew most of [victim's] head off"); People v. Cain, 525 N.E.2d
1194, 1200 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (merciless beating with substantial injuries); People v. Sperow, 525 N.E.2d 223, 232 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (victim murdered when
defendant crushed head with 24 pound block of concrete); People v. Hall, 518
N.E.2d 275, 282 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (victim brutally beaten and then thrown to
death head first down elevator shaft); People v. Winston, 435 N.E.2d 1327, 1388
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (victim repeatedly beaten with ashtray until unconscious
and then strangled to death).
Exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior allowing for the imposition of an
extended-term can occur after the victim is dead. See People v. Grady, 438
N.E.2d 608, 614 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (defendant kicked victim after shooting him);
People v. Schlemm, 402 N.E.2d 810, 818 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (concealing corpse
shows brutal and heinous behavior); see also People v. Nelson, 571 N.E.2d 879,
886 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (natural life term imposed under § 5-8-1(a)(1) when after
firing one shot at close range in victim's head, defendant kicked victim).
181. People v. Cabrera, 508 N.E.2d 708, 717 (Ill. 1987); Sperow, 525 N.E.2d at
232; People v. Sperow, 525 N.E.2d 223, 232 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). This inability to
articulate why an offense rises to the level of exceptionally brutal or heinous
indicative of wanton cruelty again raises constitutional questions. See infra
text accompanying note 222.
182. See People v. Hernandez, 562 N.E.2d 219, 221 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (victim
stabbed 89 times); People v. Lindsay, 550 N.E.2d 719, 723 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(repeated beatings to head); People v. Rixie, 546 N.E.2d 52, 61 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989) (victim stabbed between 40 and 50 times); People v. Wrice, 488 N.E.2d
1313, 1370 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). (over 100 bruises on victim); People v. Grady, 438
N.E.2d 608, 614 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); People v. Kulpa, 430 N.E.2d 164, 167 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1981) (victim stabbed and slashed 26 times).
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H.

PriorCriminalHistory

It has been stated that "In determining whether an extendedterm should be given, the trial court should look at the nature of
the offense committed as well as the defendant's prior criminal record."' 4 Although courts have looked to a defendant's prior criminal activity or lack of it as a factor in determining whether an
extended-term could be imposedas5 or not imposed, 8 6 this practice
is clearly wrong.' 8 7 It appears that the Illinois Supreme Court
might have even required that trial courts examine a defendant's
prior criminal history in determining whether to impose an extended-term under section 5-5-3.2(b)(2).188 The focus of imposing an
extended-term under section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) is on the offense the defendant was convicted of committing. The clear language of the
statute states specifically that "the offense" be accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. 189 Further, in finding that an extended-term sentence may be
imposed based upon accountability, the courts have stated that the
focus is on the offense committed and not the defendant's participation.9 ° The focus in imposing an extended-term should not be on
the defendant's prior criminal record, because the record has nothing to do with the offense for which the defendant is convicted.
Also, it has been held that the purpose of section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) is not
intended to punish recidivist defendants' 9 ' which is precisely what
a trial court does when it considers prior criminal history. Therefore, although courts have considered a defendant's prior criminal
183. People v. Barfield, 543 N.E.2d 812, 819 (fI1. App. Ct. 1989) (one gunshot

wound found to be brutal and heinous); People v. Hickman, 492 N.E.2d 1041,
1049 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (same); People v. McGee, 460 N.E.2d 843, 847 (Ill.
App.
Ct. 1984) (same).
184. People v. Sias, 415 N.E.2d 618, 624 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1981) (extended-term

upheld based on, among other things, defendant's prior record).
185. See People v. Edens, 529 N.E.2d 617, 624-25 (Ill App. Ct. 1988); People v.
Johnson, 513 N.E.2d 852, 859 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); see also People v. Whitlock, 528
N.E.2d 1371, 1391 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); People v. LaPointe, 431 N.E.2d 344, 353
(Ill. 1981).
186. People v. Andrews, 548 N.E.2d 1025, 1032 (Ill. 1989); People v. Green,
532 N.E.2d 442, 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); People v. Bedony, 527 N.E.2d 916, 921
(Ill. App. Ct. 1988); People v. Olesch, 492 N.E.2d 1381, 1391 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
187. See People v. Anderson, 559 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
188. See People v. Curtis, 566 N.E.2d 324, 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (court re-

versed and remanded with directions to the trial court that it should consider
the defendant's prior criminal history in light of the supreme court's decision in
Andrews, 548 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. 1989)).
189. See People v. Pirrello, 565 N.E.2d 324, 330-31 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (Rein-

hard, J., specially concurring).
190. See supra text accompanying note 94.
191. People v. Jones, 515 N.E.2d 166, 175 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
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record or lack of one in determining the propriety of an extendedterm sentence under section 5-5-3.2(b)(2), this consideration is improper. However, once the trial court finds that the offense was
accompanied by exceptionally brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty, the trial court can then consider prior criminal history in determining the length of the extended term.192
I.

Elements of the Offense

A trial court may not rely on an element inherent in the offense for which the defendant was convicted as a factor to show
exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. 193 Section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) is to focus attention upon the exceptionally violent aspects of certain crimes, not otherwise inherent in
the prohibited conduct. 19 4 For example, a trial court cannot consider the element of force or threat of force in determining that
rape or deviate sexual assault is exceptionally brutal or heinous.195
However, even if the trial court errs and looks to an element inherent in the offense, such as considering the victim's death as a factor
in sentencing a defendant for a murder conviction, that error may
not require remandment for resentencing. 196 Further, the trial
court can consider the amount of force employed in determining
that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior. 197 The trial court also need not ignore certain facts
192. People v. Pirrello, 565 N.E.2d 324, 331 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (Reinhard, J.,
specially concurring).

193. People v. Green, 532 N.E.2d 442, 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); People v. Reynolds, 451 N.E.2d 1003, 1007 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) ("It would seem that any armed
robbery, either expressly or impliedly, carries with it a threat that a weapon
will be used if the victim does not comply with the demands of the robber. This
factor does not necessarily support a finding that the behavior is exceptionally
brutal or heinous.").
194. People v. Clark, 429 N.E.2d 1255, 1262 (IM. App. Ct. 1981).
195. People v. Olesch, 492 N.E.2d 1381, 1391 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
196. People v. Green, 568 N.E.2d 92, 101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (extended-term
sentence of 60 years for murder conviction upheld even though trial court erred
in considering death as an aggravating factor in imposing sentence under § 5-53.2(b)(2)).
197. See supra text accompanying note 180; see also People v. Cain, 525
N.E.2d 1194, 1200 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); People v. Sperow, 525 N.E.2d 223, 232 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1988); see generally People v. Saldivar, 497 N.E.2d 1138 (Ill. 1986) (impermissible for a trial court to impose a more severe sentence on the ground
that the defendant caused the victim serious bodily harm, i.e., death, because
death is inherent in the offense of voluntary manslaughter). For a list of
Saldivar's application, see People v. Johnson, 564 N.E.2d 913, 917 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990). Furthermore, in People v. Furguson, 547 N.E.2d 429, 433 (Ill. 1989), the
court stated that "Generally, a factor implicit in the offense for which the defendant has been convicted cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing for that offense, absent a clear legislative intent to accomplish the result."
IdAt least one commentator has expressed that in sentencing
defendants this
area is confusing and difficult to apply. See Patricia Hartmann, Factors in Ag-
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which constitute an element of the offense if the element overlaps
with facts showing brutal or heinous behavior. For example, the
trial court need not ignore facts which provide the basis for a conviction for heinous battery in imposing an extended-term. 198
In People v. Olesch,199 the court concluded that the trial court
must have considered the element of force and held that an extended-term sentence was improper under section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) because the offense was not exceptionally brutal or heinous. In
Olesch, the defendant grabbed the victim around the neck as she
walked down the street and threatened to kill the victim if she
screamed. The defendant told the victim that he was carrying a
knife. The defendant forced the victim down a back stairwell at the
rear of a house. The defendant then raped the victim and forced
her to perform oral sex. The defendant then raped a second time
and again forced the victim to perform oral sex.200 The Olesch
court found that the offense was not accompanied by exceptionally
brutal or heinous behavior and therefore reduced the extended20
term. 1
However, in People v. Busja,20 2 the court found that the offense was exceptionally brutal or heinous based on the following
facts. After the victim parked her car and entered her apartment
building, the victim entered the elevator at the same time as the
defendant. The defendant exited the elevator at the same floor
with the victim and then grabbed her and demanded money. The
victim gave the defendant $30 and he ordered her to go outside.
The defendant then forced the victim down a stairwell and led her
to a parking lot, where he forced her to perform oral sex. The defendant then attempted to rape her. The defendant then placed the
victim face down and ordered her to count to one hundred as he
departed. 20 3 The court found that the trial court did not err in sentencing the victim based on the "'exceptionally brutal and heinous'
204
nature of the attack."
Again, when two different courts are faced with similar facts,
the courts reached opposite conclusions as to whether the offense
was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior.
gravation and Mitigation. A Trap for the Sentencing Judge?, 33 DEPAuL L.
REv. 357, 364-67 (1984).

198. People v. Yarbrough, 509 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); see also
People v. Pena, 528 N.E.2d 325, 329 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
199. 492 N.E.2d 1381 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1986).

200. Olesch, 492 N.E.2d at 1384.
201. Id. at 1391.
202. 509 N.E.2d 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
203. Id. at 170.

204. Id. at 173.
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5-5-3.2(b)(2)

The constitutionality of section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) has been challenged several times. However, on each occasion, section 5-53.2(b)(2) has been upheld.20 5 The phrase "exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty" has also been up2 07
held as used in section 5-8-1(a)(1)(b) 2° 6 and section 9-1(b)(7).
Further, the sentencing scheme allowing a trial court to impose
either an extended-term sentence under section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) upon
any felony conviction, including murder, accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty or,
under section 5-8-1(a)(1), for a term of natural life, as opposed to an
extended-term, for murder accompanied by the same type of behavior has also been upheld as not violating the defendant's equal pro20 8
tection rights.
Although section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) has not been found to be unconstitutionally vague, many courts' analyses are cursory 2° 9 or simply
205. Peeples v. Greer, 566 F. Supp. 580, 589 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
206. People v. LaPointe, 431 N.E.2d 344, 352 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); see also People v. Rainge, 570 N.E.2d 431, 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Barnhill, 543
N.E.2d 1374, 1380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); People v. Merchel, 414 N.E.2d 808, 811 (Ill.
App. Ct 1980); People v. Nobles, 404 N.E.2d 330, 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980). It has
also been upheld against claims that the statute violates the Illinois Constitution because it fails to consider rehabilitative potential as requirel under Article I, section 11. People v. Bartik, 418 N.E.2d 1108, 1114 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
207. People v. Odle, 538 N.E.2d 428 (IMI. 1989).
In People v. Lucas, 548 N.E.2d 1003 (Ill. 1989), the Illinois Supreme Court
limited the imposition of the death penalty under § 9-1(b)(7) to those cases involving death that was premeditated, prolonged or tortuous. ICE at 1022-23.
Therefore, because the decedent was suffocated immediately after other injuries were inflicted, the murder was not prolonged; thus, the death penalty was
vacated. I. at 1023.
The conclusion that to impose a death penalty under this section requires a
finding of premeditation or prolonged or tortuous behavior conflicts with the
holding in LaPointe which expressly rejected this contention. However, in the
former, capital punishment is involved; therefore, it appears that the supreme
Court was giving the statute a limited construction thereby saving it from
Eighth Amendment challenges. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092 (1990);
Walton v. Arizona, 110 S. Ct. 3047 (1990); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356
(1988). Thus, the same statutory language, namely, "exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty," means two different things depending on the punishment allowed by the statute.
Further, Maynard, supra, has been held to be applicable only to capital
cases, and, therefore, is of no use when challenging the constitutionality of § 55-3.2(b)(2), People v. Page, 550 N.E.2d 248, 251 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), or § 5-81(a)(1)(b), Barnhill, 543 N.E.2d at 1380.
208. People v. Abernathy, 545 N.E.2d 201, 218 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); People v.
Whitlock, 528 N.E.2d 1371, 1391 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); People v. Cartalino, 444
N.E.2d 662, 673 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
209. People v. Cooper, 483 N.E.2d 309, 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); People v.
Smith, 418 N.E.2d 172, 178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
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rely on precedent without much discussion. 210 "A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the

21
attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory applications." '
The test for determining whether a statute violates due process of
law on the grounds of vagueness is whether the terms are so illdefined that the ultimate meaning rests on the opinions of the trier
of fact rather than any objective criteria or facts, 212 or if a person of
common intelligence must speculate as to its meaning.21 3 To satisfy
the requirements of due process, mathematical certainty is not required. 214 However, a statute's prohibitions must be sufficiently definite when measured by common understanding and practice.21 5 In
considering a vagueness challenge to a statute, absent a contrary
legislative intent, a court will assume the words used in a statute
retain their ordinary and popularly understood meanings. 2 16 Section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 21 7 under this standard for three reasons.
First, as has been shown throughout Part II, courts confronted
with similar facts have reached different conclusions as to whether
the offense rises to the level which allows a trial judge to impose an
21 8
extended-term sentence.
Second, when a court is confronted with facts which show that,
under the factors enumerated above, an extended-term is appropri-

210. Page, 550 N.E.2d at 251; People v. Fyke, 546 N.E.2d 1101, 1108 (Ill.
App.

Ct. 1989); People v. Johnson, 459 N.E.2d 1000, 1013 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); People v.
Kulpa, 430 N.E.2d 164, 169 (IM. App. Ct. 1981).
211. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 497-98 (1982).
212. People v. LaPointe, 431 N.E.2d 344, 352 (Ill. 1981); People v. Clark, 429
N.E.2d 1255,1262 (I. App. Ct. 1981). Both cases cite to People v. Pembrock, 342
N.E.2d 28, 30 (Mll.
1976).
213. People v. Turner, 416 N.E.2d 1149, 1155 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1981) (citing Lanyetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) and Connelley v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926)).
214. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972).
215. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947); People v. Wawczak, 486
N.E.2d 911, 913 (Ill. 1985).
216. People v. Fabing, 570 N.E.2d 329, 332 (Ill. 1991) (defining "life threatening reptile").
217. The statute does not violate the Eighth Amendment's vagueness aspect
because that only applies to capital cases, unless the proportionality of the sentence is challenged. See People v. Hernandez, 562 N.E.2d 219, 228 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990); People v. Brown, 551 N.E.2d 1100, 1109 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); People v.
Peeples, 539 N.E.2d 1376, 1379 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); see also Peeples v. Greer, 739
F.2d 262, 265 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
The "Fourteenth Amendment" is capitalized in this article to give it the
respect it deserves. See Lawrence A. Benner, DiminishingExpectations of Privacy in the Rehnquist Court, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 825 n.2 (1989); Clifford S.
Fishman, Police Trespassand the FourthAmendment A Wall in Need ofMending, 22 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 795 n.3 (1989).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 153-157, 169-174 and 199-204.
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ate, a court may find that the offense does not rise to the level of
exceptionally brutal or heinous. However, when confronted with
facts showing none of the factors listed above, a court may find that
an extended-term is appropriate. For example, in People v.
Bedony,21 9 the court found that the defendant's conviction for attempted murder was not exceptionally brutal or heinous indicative
of wanton cruelty even though the court found the following- the
defendant's actions were premeditated; the defendant beat the victim on the head; the defendant forced the victim to lay down on the
220
floor; and the defendant shot the victim and left him for dead.
However, in People v. Johnson,221 during an attempted armed robbery, when the defendant drew his gun, one of the victims in the
store told the defendant, "You can get hurt playing like that." The
defendant then shot the victim, who eventually died from the
wound. The court upheld an extended-term sentence under section
5-5-3.2(b)(2). 2 22 Thus, even with recognized factors showing exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty, the
decision to apply an extended-term appears to rest on the whims of
judges rather than any objective criteria.
Third, the vagueness of section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) is also shown by
several courts' failure to articulate why an offense rises to the level
of exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty. Weak analyses pervade appellate court decisions2 23 and
even an Illinois Supreme Court decision.22 4 For example, in People
v. Freeman,225 the court merely gave the following analysis of why
the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior:
A fair consideration of this issue shows that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion. The victim's death resulted from exceptionally
219. 527 N.E.2d 916 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
220. Bedony, 527 N.E.2d at 920.
221. 459 N.E.2d 1000 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
222. Johnson, 459 N.E.2d at 1013; see also People v. Morrison, 484 N.E.2d 329,
340-41 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (no recognized factor showing exceptionally brutal or
heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty was present).
223. See, e.g., People v. Kendall, 572 N.E.2d 363, 367 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) ("In
light of the brutality of the crime and defendant's limited rehabilitative potential, we conclude that defendant's 35-year sentence was not an abuse of
discretion.").
224. People v. Cabrera, 508 N.E.2d 708, 717 (Ill. 1987), cert denied, 484 U.S.
929 (1987). In that case the court stated:
"We have reviewed the trial court's sentencing of the defendant; the testimony of Dr. Teas regarding the autopsy of the victim, including the cause
of death; the photographs of the victim; and the scene of the crime. On this
record it cannot be said that the trial court abused discretion in imposing an
extended-term sentence of 60 years for this brutal murder for gain." This
analysis tells the readers very little except that if they saw the pictures of
the victim, they too would find that an extended term was appropriate.
225. 538 N.E.2d 681 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
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brutal and heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. The court
heard testimony on the severity of the crime, the victim's age, and the
defendant's age and potential for rehabilitation. The trial court's comthat it considered the aggravating
ments during sentencing indicate
226
and mitigating circumstances.
the court merely stated the
Similarly, in People v. Peterson,2
following:
Defendant also suggests that the trial court abused its discretion when
it sentenced her to an extended-term of 50 years' incarceration. The
offense committed here was accompanied by exceptionally brutal and
that the trial court abused its
heinous behavior... We cannot conclude
228
discretion in imposing the sentence.
Also, in Peoplev. Morrison, 229 the court only offered the following
reasoning why the extended-term was proper.
In the case at bar, we find that the trial court had sufficient informational and legal bases to support the imposition of extended-term
sentences where the court found that the offenses were accompanied
by exceptionally heinous and brutal behavior. 230
While the terms of the statute may have been defined, merely
defining the terms does not give any more guidance as to when the
behavior allows the imposition of an extended-term. Further, the
emphasis on the "exceptional" nature of the crime does not help
explain when the statute is applicable. 231 The court's "I know it
when I see it" 2 3 2 standard is exemplified in People v. Olesch,2 3 3 in
which the trial court stated, "[I]f that isn't brutal and heinous and
wanton cruelty, then I suppose there is no such definition for the
words heinous, brutal and wanton." 234 However, the appellate
226. Freeman, 538 N.E.2d at 684.
227. 525 N.E.2d 946 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
228. Peterson,525 N.E.2d at 950. For other cases with similarly weak analysis, see also People v. Bishop, 534 N.E.2d 401, 404 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); People v.
Cole, 522 N.E.2d 635, 643 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (applying § 5-8-1(a)(1)); People v.
Busija, 509 N.E.2d 168, 173 (IM. App. Ct. 1986); People v. Gray, 408 N.E.2d 1150,
1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
229. 484 N.E.2d 329 (IlM. App. Ct. 1985).
230. Morrison, 484 N.E.2d at 340.
231. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364 (1988). In Maynard, the
United States Supreme Court stated:
The State's contention that the addition of the word 'especially' somehow
guides the jury's discretion, even if the term 'heinous,' does not, is untenable. To say that something is 'especially heinous' merely suggests that the
individual jurors should determine that the murder is more than just 'heinous,' whatever that means, and an ordinary person could honestly believe
that every unjustified, intentional taking of human life is 'especially
heinous.'
Id. at 364.
232. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart J., concurring). In
Jacobellis,Justice Stewart, as well as the rest of the Supreme Court, was struggling with defining obscenity.
233. 492 N.E.2d 1381 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
234. 1I at 1391.
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court reversed, finding that the offense did not rise to the level necessary to impose an extended-term. 2- Certainly, if appellate judges
and trial judges, hopefully people of common intelligence, are so
divided as to when an offense rises to this level, there is much speculation as to the meaning of the statute. Thus, despite the case law
to the contrary, section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) is vague and violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, a statute can be saved from challenges of vagueness if
a court gives the statute a limited construction. 23 6 The Illinois
Supreme Court may have saved any new vagueness challenge of
section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) by giving the statute a limited construction in
People v. Andrews.237 In Andrews, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the State's argument that an extended-term may be imposed
for a murder conviction in which the defendant shot a defenseless
victim during an armed robbery when the defendant could have
achieved his goal without killing the victim. In Andrews, the defendant entered a car that had exited from the Eisenhower Expressway and which was stopped at a light. The defendant shot the
driver in the right temple at close range and ordered the victim's
girlfriend to give him all her money. The victim died as a result of
the wound. 8s The Illinois Supreme Court, finding that an extended-term was improper, stated the following:
Although the victim was defenseless and the defendant could have
achieved his goal of robbing the victim and the victim's girlfriend without killing the victim, every single murder is by nature unnecessary;
section 5-5-3.2(b)(2), however, requires that the murder be "exceptionally" brutal or heinous. All murders are brutal and heinous to a certain degree. Moreover, many murdered robbery victims are
defenseless when killed. Section 5-8-2, however, allowing for extended-term sentences, "was not intended to convert every offense into
an extraordinary offense subject to an extended-term sentence." People v. Evans (1981), 87 M.2d 77, 88-89.P 9
The decision in Andrews appears to be an attempt by the Illinois Supreme Court to control the use of section 5-5-3.2(b)(2).
Although some courts may hesitate to find Andrews to be a "new
trend" or "new law,"2 40 other courts have followed the new trend.
235. Id.
236. See Lewis v. Jeffers, 110 S. Ct. 3092 (1990); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486
U.S. 356 (1988); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (New
Hampshire Supreme Court gave limiting construction of state's breach of peace
statute to save it from violating First Amendment); People v. Wawczak, 486
N.E.2d 911, 913 (Ill. 1985); see also People v. Lang, 498 N.E.2d 1105, 1127 (Ill.
1986) (defining "mentally ill").
237. 548 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill.
1989).
238. Andrews, 548 N.E.2d at 1032.
239. Id.
240. People v. Pirrello, 565 N.E.2d 324, 329 (Ill. 1991).
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In People v. Anderson,241 the Third District of the Illinois Appellate

Court found that an extended-term for murder was improper under
section 5-5-3.2(b)(2). In that case, the defendant interviewed the
victim for a painting contract. When the defendant tried to touch
the victim, she pushed him to the floor and a gun fell from the defendant's pocket. As the two struggled for the gun, the victim was
shot twice in the neck. 242 Relying on Andrews, the court found that
generally all murders by definition are brutal and heinous to some
extent but the extended-term provision of section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) was
intended to apply to murders that go beyond the mere infliction of
death.243 Whether this "new trend" in limiting the use of section 55-3.2(b)(2) continues and diminishes the ability to challenge the
statute on grounds of vagueness is for the Illinois courts to decide.
Therefore, although section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) has been upheld
under assertions that it is vague in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the questionable history of its application, shown by
courts reaching conflicting conclusions as to the propriety of applying the statute upon similar facts and by the court's inability to articulate why certain offenses rise to the level of exceptionally
brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty, shows that
the statute is vague. However, if a new trend evolves a limited construction in imposing extended-term sentences under section 5-53.2(b)(2), the statute may be properly saved from assertions that it
violates due process.
CONCLUSION

Although the words of section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) have been defined
and given their ordinary meaning, the language of the statute prevents any discernable standard for determining when it should be
imposed. Although several factors can be distilled from over a decade of case law, there would appear to be no agreement as to what
facts may show that a felony conviction is deserving of an extended
sentence. What strikes one judge as being an appropriate factor
may strike another as not. No objective criteria exist to determine
when a felony rises to the level of exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior indicative of wanton cruelty. Most courts appear to rely
241. 559 N.E.2d 267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); see also Pirrello,565 N.E.2d at 330
(Reinhard, J., specially concurring); People v. Fields, 555 N.E.2d 1136, 1140 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990) ("[We feel compelled to find that the defendant's conduct was
not exceptionally brutal or heinous in light of People v. Andrews (1989), 132 Ill.
2d 451, 548 N.E.2d 1025.").
242. Anderson, 559 N.E.2d at 269.
243. Id. at 271. However, this case could be narrowly construed as merely
reiterating that the elements of the offenses may not be used as an aggravating
factor but the court did not cite any cases which stand for that proposition. See
supra text accompanying note 191.
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on a gut reaction to the individual facts of each case to determine if
an extended-term is appropriate. If no gut reaction occurs, then no
extended-term may be imposed. However, if a gut reaction occurs,
then the imposition of the extended-term is rationalized by applying a variety of recognized factors. Hopefully, a new trend is developing which will construe section 5-5-3.2(b)(2) in a way that is
consistent with due process. Although that trend appears to be
starting, the decision to apply the statute in an objective and structured manner ultimately rests with the Illinois courts.

